If you've used a Web proxy server before, you're probably familiar with the environment variables http_proxy or HTTP_PROXY. You may be less familiar with no_proxy, which provides a way to exclude traffic destined to certain hosts from using the proxy. While HTTP is a well-defined standard, no standard exists for how clients should handle these variables. As a result, Web clients support these variables in subtly different ways. For one GitLab customer, these differences led to a weekend of troubleshooting that uncovered why certain services stopped communicating.


Today, most Web clients support connection to proxy servers via environment variables:

These variables tell the client what URL should be used to access the proxy servers and which exceptions should be made. For example, if you had a proxy server listening on http://alice.example.com:8080, you might use it via:

export http_proxy=http://alice.example.com:8080

Which proxy server gets used if troublesome Bob also defines the all-caps version, HTTP_PROXY?

export HTTP_PROXY=http://bob.example.com:8080

The answer surprised us: it depends. In some cases, the Alice proxy wins, and in other cases Bob wins. We'll discuss the details later.

What happens if you want to make exceptions? For example, suppose you want to use a proxy server for everything but internal.example.com and internal2.example.com. That's where the no_proxy variable comes into play. Then you would define no_proxy as follows:

export no_proxy=internal.example.com,internal2.example.com

What if you want to exclude IP addresses? Can you use asterisks or wildcards? Can you use CIDR blocks (e.g. The answer again: it depends.

How did we get here?

In 1994, most Web clients used CERN's libwww, which supported http_proxy and the no_proxy environment variables. libwww only used the lowercase form of http_proxy, and the no_proxy syntax was simple:

no_proxy is a comma- or space-separated list of machine
or domain names, with optional :port part.  If no :port
part is present, it applies to all ports on that domain.


New clients emerged that added their own HTTP implementations without linking libwww. In January 1996, Hrvoje Niksic released geturl, the predecessor of what is now wget. A month later, geturl, added support for http_proxy in v1.1. In May 1996, geturl v1.3 added support for no_proxy. Just as with libwww, geturl only supported the lowercase form.

In January 1998, Daniel Stenberg released curl v5.1, which supported the http_proxy and no_proxy variables. In addition, curl allowed the uppercase forms, HTTP_PROXY and NO_PROXY.

Plot twist: in March 2009, curl v7.19.4 dropped support for the uppercase form of HTTP_PROXY due to security concerns. However, while curl ignores HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY still works today.

State of the variables today

Fast forward to today. As my colleague Nourdin el Bacha researched, we can see that how these proxy server variables are handled varies, depending on what language or tool you are using.

http_proxy and https_proxy

In the following table, each row represents a supported behavior, while each column holds the tool (e.g. curl) or language (e.g. Ruby) to which it applies:

  curl wget Ruby Python Go
http_proxy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HTTP_PROXY No No Yes (warning) Yes (if REQUEST_METHOD not in env) Yes
https_proxy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HTTPS_PROXY Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Case precedence lowercase lowercase only lowercase lowercase Uppercase
Reference source source source source source

Note that http_proxy and https_proxy are always supported across the board, while HTTP_PROXY is not always supported. Python (via urllib) complicates the picture even more: HTTP_PROXY can be used as long as REQUEST_METHOD is not defined in the environment.

While you might expect environment variables to be all-caps, http_proxy came first, so that's the de facto standard. When in doubt, go with the lowercase form because that's universally supported.

Unlike most implementations, Go tries the uppercase version before falling back to the lowercase version. We will see later why that caused issues for one GitLab customer.


Some users have discussed the lack of the no_proxy specification in this issue. As no_proxy specifies an exclusion list, many questions arise about how it behaves. For example, suppose your no_proxy configuration is defined:

export no_proxy=example.com

Does this mean that the domain must be an exact match, or will subdomain.example.com also match against this configuration? The following table shows the state of various implementations. It turns out all implementations will match suffixes properly, as shown in the Matches suffixes? row:

  curl wget Ruby Python Go
no_proxy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NO_PROXY Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Case precedence lowercase lowercase only lowercase lowercase Uppercase
Matches suffixes? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Strips leading .? Yes No Yes Yes No
* matches all hosts? Yes No No Yes Yes
Supports regexes? No No No No No
Supports CIDR blocks? No No Yes No Yes
Detects loopback IPs? No No No No Yes
Reference source source source source source

However, if there is a leading . in the no_proxy setting, the behavior varies. For example, curl and wget behave differently. curl will always strip the leading . and match against a domain suffix. This call bypasses the proxy:

$ env https_proxy=http://non.existent/ no_proxy=.gitlab.com curl https://gitlab.com
<html><body>You are being <a href="https://about.gitlab.com/">redirected</a>.</body></html>

However, wget does not strip the leading . and performs an exact string match against a hostname. As a result, wget attempts to use a proxy if a top-level domain is used:

$ env https_proxy=http://non.existent/ no_proxy=.gitlab.com wget https://gitlab.com
Resolving non.existent (non.existent)... failed: Name or service not known.
wget: unable to resolve host address 'non.existent'

In all implementations, regular expressions are never supported. I suspect using regexes complicates matters further, because regexes have their own flavors (e.g. PCRE, POSIX, etc.). Using regexes also introduces potential performance and security issues.

In some cases, setting no_proxy to * effectively disables proxies altogether, but this is not a universal rule.

No implementation performs a DNS lookup to resolve a hostname to an IP address when deciding if a proxy should be used. Do not specify IP addresses in no_proxy variable unless you expect that the IPs are explictly used by the client.

The same holds true for CIDR blocks, such as CIDR blocks only work when the request is directly made to an IP address. Only Go and Ruby allow CIDR blocks. Unlike other implementations, Go even automatically disables the use of a proxy if it detects a loopback IP addresses.

Why does this matter?

If you have an application written in multiple languages that needs to work behind a corporate firewall with a proxy server, you may need to pay attention to these differences. For example, GitLab is composed of a few services written in Ruby and Go. One customer set its proxy configuration to something like the following:

HTTP_PROXY: http://proxy.company.com
HTTPS_PROXY: http://proxy.company.com
NO_PROXY: .correct-company.com

The customer reported the following issue with GitLab:

  1. A git push from the command line worked
  2. Git changes made via the Web UI failed

Our support engineers discovered that due to a Kubernetes configuration issue, a few stale values lingered. The pod actually had an environment that looked something like:

HTTP_PROXY: http://proxy.company.com
HTTPS_PROXY: http://proxy.company.com
NO_PROXY: .correct-company.com
no_proxy: .wrong-company.com

The inconsistent definitions in no_proxy and NO_PROXY set off red flags, and we could have resolved the issue by making them consistent or removing the incorrect entry. But let's drill into what happened. Remember from above that:

  1. Ruby tries the lowercase form first
  2. Go tries the uppercase form first

As a result, services written in Go, such as GitLab Workhorse, had the correct proxy configuration. A git push from the command line worked fine because the Go services primarily handled this activity:

sequenceDiagram autonumber participant C as Client participant W as Workhorse participant G as Gitaly C->>W: git push W->>G: gRPC: PostReceivePack G->>W: OK W->>C: OK

The gRPC call in step 2 never attempted to use the proxy because no_proxy was configured properly to connect directly to Gitaly.

However, when a user makes a change in the UI, Gitaly forwards the request to a gitaly-ruby service, which is written in Ruby. gitaly-ruby makes changes to the repository and reports back via a gRPC call back to its parent process. However, as seen in step 4 below, the reporting step didn't happen:

sequenceDiagram autonumber participant C as Client participant R as Rails participant G as Gitaly participant GR as gitaly-ruby participant P as Proxy C->>R: Change file in UI R->>G: gRPC: UserCommitFiles G->>GR: gRPC: UserCommitFiles GR->>P: CONNECT P->>GR: FAIL

Since gRPC uses HTTP/2 as the underlying transport, gitaly-ruby attempted a CONNECT to the proxy since it was configured with the wrong no_proxy setting. The proxy immediately rejected this HTTP request, causing the failure in the Web UI push case.

Once we eliminated the lowercase no_proxy from the environment, pushes from the UI worked as expected, and gitaly-ruby connected directly to the parent Gitaly process. Step 4 worked properly in the diagram below:

sequenceDiagram autonumber participant C as Client participant R as Rails participant G as Gitaly participant GR as gitaly-ruby participant P as Proxy C->>R: Change file in UI R->>G: gRPC: UserCommitFiles G->>GR: gRPC: UserCommitFiles GR->>G: OK G->>R: OK R->>C: OK

A surprising discovery with gRPC

Note that the customer set HTTPS_PROXY to an unencrypted HTTP proxy; notice that http:// is used instead of https://. While this isn't ideal from a security standpoint, some people do this to avoid the hassle of clients failing due to TLS certificate verification issues.

Ironically, if an HTTPS proxy were specified, we would not have seen this problem. If an HTTPS proxy is used, gRPC will ignore this setting since HTTPS proxies are not supported.

The lowest common denominator

I think we can all agree that one should never define inconsistent values with lowercase and uppercase proxy settings. However, if you ever have to manage a stack written in multiple languages, you might need to consider setting HTTP proxy configurations to the lowest common denominator:

http_proxy and https_proxy


  1. Use lowercase form.
  2. Use comma-separated hostname:port values.
  3. IP addresses are okay, but hostnames are never resolved.
  4. Suffixes are always matched (e.g. example.com will match test.example.com).
  5. If top-level domains need to be matched, avoid using a leading dot (.).
  6. Avoid using CIDR matching since only Go and Ruby support that.

Standardizing no_proxy

Knowing the least common denominator can help avoid issues if these definitions are copied for different Web clients. But should no_proxy and the other proxy settings have a documented standard rather than an ad hoc convention? The list below may serve as a starting point for a proposal:

  1. Prefer lowercase forms over uppercase variables (e.g. http_proxy should be searched before HTTP_PROXY).
  2. Use comma-separated hostname:port values.
    • Each value may include optional whitespace.
  3. Never perform DNS lookups or use regular expressions.
  4. Use * to match all hosts.
  5. Strip leading dots (.) and match against domain suffixes.
  6. Support CIDR block matching.
  7. Never make assumptions about special IP addresses (e.g. loopback addresses in no_proxy).


It's been over 25 years since the first Web proxy was released. While the basic mechanics of configuring a Web client via environment variables have not changed much, a number of subtleties have emerged across different implementations. We saw for one customer, erroneously defining conflicting no_proxy and NO_PROXY variables led to hours of troubleshooting due to the differences with which Ruby and Go parse these settings. We hope highlighting these differences will avoid future issues in your production stack, and we hope that Web client maintainers will standardize the behavior to avoid such issues in the first place.

Cover image on PixaBay

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